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Comments
PAROL EVIDENCE TO VARY A RECITAL OF
CONSIDERATION
While the Louisiana Civil Code makes a lawful cause or
consideration a condition to the legal validity of a contract, it
also imposes limitations upon the admissibility of certain types
of evidence offered for the purpose of disproving statements made
in written contracts. A possible conflict between the requirement
of consideration and the rules of evidence is thus created. The
question arises: May parol evidence be introduced in an action
between the parties to a written contract to disprove a specific
recital of consideration paid?
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In considering the problem, it will be assumed that no fraud,
violence, or error is involved. The rights of third parties to dis-
prove the declarations of contracts to which they are not privy
will not be discussed. An examination will first be made of the
various types of evidence which may be offered for the suggested
purpose. The discussion will include the French rules on the ad-
missibility of parol evidence and a comparison of the Louisiana
and French codal provisions in order to determine the applica-
bility in Louisiana of the conclusions reached by the French com-
mentators and courts. It will conclude with a review of the Lou-
isiana cases.
THE TYPES OF EVIDENCE
A contract may be proved either by the writings drawn up
to record it or by oral testimony. The chapter of the Louisiana
Civil Code dealing with the proof of obligations enumerates four
classes of evidence: literal proof, testimonial proof, presumptions,
and judicial confessions. For this discussion, the latter may be
said to include interrogatories on facts and articles., The French
Civil Code, in addition to the foregoing provisions, includes a
section on proof by means of judicial oaths and an article estab-
lishing a hybrid means of proof constituting a combination of
the principles of literal and testimonial proof. This is known as
the commencement of proof in writing.2
Literal proof consists in written instruments signed by the
parties and witnesses thereto.3 Such instruments may be passed
in the presence of a notary and two witnesses (authentic acts) 4
or privately signed by the parties (acts under private signature).
When an act under private signature is offered as proof against
a party thereto, and he acknowledges its execution, 5 or is legally
held to have done so by failing to object to its introduction 6 or
because it has been proved his act,' it is then equal in probative
value to the authentic act. All literal proof is superior to, that is,
of greater evidentiary weight than testimonial evidence.8
1. Arts. 347, 348, 355, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
2. Art. 1347, French Civil Code.
3. 5 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais (Derni~re ed. 1833) 1, no 1. See also
12 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1922) 184, § 756.
4. Art. 1317, French Civil Code; Art. 2234, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Art. 1322, French Civil Code; Art. 2242, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 219, § 756; 13 Duranton,
Cours de Droit FranQais (3 ed. 1834) 124, no 122; 4 Toullier, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 369, no 813.
7. 12 Aubry et Rau, loc. cit. supra note 6; 8 I-Iuc, Commentaire Th~orique
et Pratique du Code Civil (1895) 292, no 236; 4 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 6.
8. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 331-332, § 763; 7 Planiol et
[Vol. III
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Both authentic acts and those under private signature make
"full proof" of anything stated in them that relates directly to
the object for which the instrument is drawn, without need of
evidentiary corroboration.9 And since both types of instruments
have the same probative value, the same kind of evidence is re-
quired to contradict them.10
Testimonial evidence may not be introduced against or be-
yond the contents of a written instrument,1 but such evidence
may be introduced if there exists a commencement of proof in
writing. 12 This requires a written instrument emanating from the
party against whom proof is to be made, rendering probable the
existence of the fact which is to be proved.13 When such a writing
has been produced, testimonial evidence may be admitted.
Except for a passing reference in Article 2238, the Louisiana
Civil Code omits the French article establishing the exception
based on a commencement of proof in writing." While it may be
doubted whether the redactors of our Code intended to include
this exception, it shall be assumed that it is recognized in Lou-
isiana. Otherwise no writing would be admissible to vary a writ-
ten contract unless it met the requirements of literal proof or
Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1931) 853, no 1515; 2 Planiol,
Trait6 El~mentaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1939) 15, no 40; 1 Pothier, Obliga-
tions (Transl. by Evans, 3rd. Am. ed. 1853) 542, no 758.
9. Art. 1319, French Civil Code; Art. 2236, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Thus simple written proof may be introduced against the authentic
act as well as the act under private signature. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 249, § 756bis; 1 Demogue, Trait6 des Obligations En G~n~ral(1923) 272, no 169. However, there are certain cases where from the very
nature of the authentic act, its probative value is greater than that of the
private act. In the first place, there is no need to show acknowledgment
or prove the authentic act. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 8, at 543, no 763.
When the authentic act states facts within the personal knowledge of the
officer who executes it, such as the date of execution or the fact that one
party paid a certain sum to the other in the officer's presence, these may
not be contradicted by any means other than an impeachment of the in-
strument through a special and difficult procedure, the inscription de faux.
However, while the very fact itself may not be contradicted, it may be ex-
plained by other admissible evidence. Thus a party may show that while
he actually received the sum stated in the officer's presence, he had pre-
viously given the money which changed hands to the other party to be used
for that purpose. For a discussion of these differences and the similarity in
all other respects of authentic acts and acts under private signature, see
12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 171 et seq., § 755; 29 Demolombe,
Cours de Code Napoleon, 6 Trait6 des Contrats (1876) 249, no 279; 13 Duran-
ton, op. cit. supra note 6, at 74, nos 86-88; 5 Marcad6, Explication Th6orique
et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed. 1873) 23, Art. 1319.
11. Art. 1341, French Civil Code; Art. 2276, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Art. 1347, French Civil Code.
13. Ibid. 12 Aubry et Rau, loc. cit. supra note 3.
14. Art. 2238, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Enunciations foreign to the dis-
position, can serve only as a commencement of proof."
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confessions." Whenever the term "written evidence" is used,
therefore, it will include both literal proof and writings which
serve as a commencement of proof. Testimonial, oral, or parol
evidence shall refer only to proof sought to be made by means
of the testimony of witnesses.
The answer to an interrogatory on facts and articles is in the
nature of a judicial confession. 16 Therefore it is admissible on
any fact at issue, 17 just as is the judicial confession.18 The verbal
extra-judicial confession may be introduced only where oral evi-
dence may be admitted19 and the written extra-judicial confes-
sion constitutes at least a commencement of proof in writing."0
Generally, answers to interrogatories may be contradicted by
parol evidence. 21 But if the fact sought to be proved is one which
parol evidence was originally inadmissible to establish, the denial
of the fact in the answer to an interrogatory may be disputed
only by those types of evidence originally admissible.22
The presumptions irrefutably established by law in regard to
the problem here under consideration are those codal rules which
determine the relative probative value of written and parol evi-
dence. The simple presumptions referred to in Article 2288 are
admissible only where testimonial evidence is admissible, by the
15. In Purdon v. Linton's Executors, 9 La. 563 (1836), the Louisiana Su-
preme Court referred to an ordinary letter from one party to the other as a
"counter letter," admitting it as such. The letter should have been admitted
as an admission, or a commencement of proof in writing, for to be valid
as a counter letter, the instrument must be signed by both parties to the
contract or instrument which it contradicts. In reality, the counter letter
is a contract varying what is the apparent contractual relation of the parties.
Whether the later contract is a counter letter or a novation depends upon
the intentions of the parties, particularly whether the original contract was
designedly drawn to include false statements or to set up an apparent state
of facts different from the true situation. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 251, § 756bis; Gaudemet, Th6orie G6n6ral des Obligations (1937)
230; 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 8, at 446, no 1186. See Eustis v. St. Germain,
161 So. 203 (La. App. 1935), in which a letter was classified as "written evi-
dence" under La. Act 11 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2024-2025].
16. Cf. Art. 349, La. Code. of Practice of 1870.
17. The answers to interrogatories on facts and articles are admissible
against any type of evidence including authentic acts. Semere v. Semere, 10
La. Ann. 704 (1855); Newman v. Shelley, 36 La. Ann. 100 (1884).
18. It makes full proof against the confessor and can be revoked only
by alleging and proving error of fact. Art. 1356, French Civil Code; Art. 2291,
La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Art. 1355, French Civil Code; Art. 2290, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. 2 Colin et Capitant, Cours El6mentaire de Droit Civil Frangais (8
ed. 1936) 463, no 499.
21. Art. 354, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
22. Bach v. Hall, 3 La. 116 (1831); Wright-Blodgett Co. v. Elms, 106 La.
150, 30 So. 311 (1901); Le Bleu v. Savoie, 109 La. 680, 33 So. 729 (1903); Lar-
rido v. Perkins, 132 La. 660, 61 So. 728 (1913); Rubenstein v. Files, 146 La.
727, 84 So. 33 (1920); Sherman v. Nehlig, 154 La. 25, 97 So. 270 (1923).
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very terms of this article.2 3 Therefore anything that may be said
with respect to the inadmissibility of oral evidence will apply
with equal force to simple presumptions.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE IN FRANCE
The parol evidence rule in France is based on the belief that
a writing is a more reliable form of proof than the testimony of
witnesses. 24 Only a few authors mention the theory used at com-
mon law that the writing is controlling because it is presumed
to be the final and complete integration of the agreement between
the parties.2 5 Rather, it is considered that since the parties have
declared their agreement in writing, the admission of testimonial
proof would substitute another mode of proof for that which the
parties had adopted.2 6 The agreement was reduced to writing at
a time when there was comparatively little reason for falsifica-
tion. If it intentionally states an untrue fact, a counter letter
could have been secured to be used in any unforeseen con-
tingency. In the absence of a counter letter, the law therefore
presumes that the written act does not include any errors or
omissions. 27 The written instrument, although fallible, is con-
sidered much more reliable than the testimony of witnesses which
is attendant with dangers of careless observation, faulty memory,
and dishonesty.28
The French rule, therefore, is that parol evidence is not ad-
missible, in the absence of a commencement of proof in writing,
against or beyond the contents of a written instrument. The
terms "against or beyond" forbid any addition to, substraction
from, contradiction or alteration of the contents of the writing.29
23. Art. 1353, French Civil Code; Art. 2288, La. Civil Code of 1870.
24. The writing is considered only as a means of proof, not as a so-
lemnity. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 307, § 762, n.3. The written
instrument drawn up to record a fact or contract is a more accurate method
of proving that fact than the testimony of witnesses. 13 Baudry-Lacantinerie
et Barde, Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, 3 (II) Des Obligations
(2 ed. 1905) 855, no 2564.
25. 13 Duranton, op. cit. supra note 6, at 361, no 330.
26. 6 Larombire, Th6orie et Pratique des Obligations (Nouvelle ed. 1885)
416, Art. 1341, nos 20, 21.
27. 2 Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil Positif Frangais (2 ed. 1933) 111,
no 208; 7 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 8, at no 1527.
28. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 298, § 761; 14 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 24, at 832, no 2517; 30 Demolombe,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 7, no 8; 2 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 27, at 109,
no 203.
29. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 333, § 763; 14 Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 24, at 856, § 2566; 5 Marcad6, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 106, 111-113, Art. 1341, nos I, III-IV; 7 Planiol et Ripert, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 866, no 1528.
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The term "contents," however, does not include everything stated
in the writing.
The authentic act makes full proof of all operative (dispositif)
portions of the contract evidenced by it, that is, those provisions
which cannot be altered or omitted without destroying or chang-
ing the contract which the parties sought to form.30 The act also
proves what is stated only in declaratory terms (l'enunciatifs)
provided those terms bear a direct relation to the disposative
clauses. Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary these contents of
a writing of which the writing makes full proof.3 1 But since the
act can serve only as a commencement of proof of those state-
ments which do not have a direct relation to the object of the
instrument, 2 oral testimony may be adduced to dispute those
statements; 8 and the benefit of the parol evidence rule may be
expressly or tacitly waived by the party against whom the testi-
mony is adduced.34 The same principles apply to an instrument
under private signature acknowledged or proved to be the act
of the party against whom proof is to be made.85
A statement of cause may be contradicted only by evidence
acceptable under the foregoing rules.86 If the statement is made
in the form of a receipt, it is considered as bearing a direct rela-
30. This definition of the operative portions is that given in 5 Marcad6,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 30, Art. 1320, no I. The insertion of the disposative
portions forms the raison d'dtre of the confection of the instrument. 2 Planiol,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 38, no 94.
31. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 332, § 763; 6 Larombire,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 418, Art. 1341, no 24.
32. 4 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 346, no 774. See also 12 Locr6, La
Ldgislation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de La France, Part II, Elemens
VIII, 325, § 28; Pothier, op. cit. supra note 8, at 532, no 738.
33. Supra note 31. See also Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 28 La. Ann. 312
(1876); Ridgely v. Fabacher, 180 La. 171, 156 So. 212 (1934), where the pur-
pose of the evidence was to rebut a presumption of ownership arising from
an act of sale.
34. There has been some disagreement on this point among the French
commentators. The early opinion was that the prohibition against oral testi-
mony was a rule adopted in the general public interest, and therefore could
not be waived. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 299, § 761; 5 Marcad6,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 157, Art. 1348, no VII; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note
3, at 18, nos 3641. See also Civ. 8 janvier 1817, Sirey 1817.1.51; Civ. 6 aoft
1828, Sirey 1828.1.305. But the later decisions held, with the approval of more
recent commentators, that the parol evidence rule may be waived. Req. 22
juillet 1878, Dalloz 1880.1.447, Sirey 1879.1.213; Req. 1 juillet 1895, Sirey 1898.1.7;
Civ. 30 d~cembre 1903, Dalloz 1904.1.93, Sirey 1906.1.452. Bonnier, Trait6
Th~orique et Pratique des Preuves en Droit Civil et en Drolt Criminel (2 ed.
1852) 146, no 135; 2 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 20, at 443, § 474;
2 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 27, at 110, no 203.
35. Art. 1322, French Civil Code.
36. 1 Demogue, loc. cit. supra note 10; 12 Locrd, loc. cit. supra note 32.
1941] COMMENTS
tion to the object of the agreement.37 The stated cause may be
varied by oral testimony or presumption only where there exists
a commencement of proof in writing.8 Even a complete want
of cause may not be shown by parol evidence. 9 The requirement
of cause is thus subordinated to the rules of proof.
The parol evidence rule is not limited in operation to con-
tracts. It encompasses all writings having a juridical effect, in-
cluding receipts. 40 The French article does not forbid parol
evidence against contracts, but against actes, written instruments.
Oral testimony may not be admitted to contradict or vary a
simple receipt; a fortiori it is inadmissible to modify the receipt
contained in a written contract. Therefore oral evidence may not
be used to show a consideration different from that expressed in
the contract, although the purpose is not to invalidate the con-
tract.
41
Thus the French rule is that parol evidence is inadmissible
to contradict a recital of cause in a written contract by showing
either that no consideration was given or that a greater or lesser
consideration than that acknowledged actually passed. 42
LOUISIANA CODE ARTICLES
The majority of the Louisiana Code articles relating to the
problem under discussion originated in the French Civil Code.
Thus, Article 1893 expressing the legal requirement of a cause
for every contract is a literal reproduction of Article 1131 of the
37. 5 Larombire, op. cit. supra note 26, at 542, Art. 1320, no 2; 12 Locr6,
op. cit. supra note 32, at 318, § 8.
The receipt makes full proof of the liberation of the debtor in regard
to the creditor. 32 Carpentier et Du Saint, Repertoire G~n~ral Alphab~tique
du Droit Frangais (1903) Quittance 35, no 36.
38. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 331, § 763; 7 Huc, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 123, no 86; 6 Larombibre, op. cit. supra note 26, at 421, Art.
1341, no 27; 16 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (2 ed. 1876) 168,
no 122; 5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 10, at 111, Art. 1341, no IV; 2 Planiol,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 30, 454, nos 71, 1206; 6 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 364, no 265.
39. 3 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 383, no 180.
40. 14 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 24, at 855, no
2563. See also 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 331, § 763; 12 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 24, 1 Des Obligations, at 368, no
318; 1 Domat, Civil Law (Transl. by Strahan, Cushing's ed. 1853) 801, no
2019; 2 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 27, at 110, no 204; 7 Planiol et Ripert,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 866, no 1528; 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 8, at 535, no
746.
41. For illustrative examples, see 2 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 27, at
111, no 209; 6 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note 26, at 421, Art. 1341, no 28; 7
Planiol et Ripert, loc. cit. supra note 40; and note 30, supra.
42. 13 Duranton, loc. cit. supra note 25; 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 30, no 71; Pothier, op. cit. supra note 8, at 544, no 765.
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French Code. Similarly, the provision of Article 2236 that the
authentic act makes full proof of the agreement contained had its
origin in French codal Article 1319. 48 Article 2238, concerning the
"enunciations" and the dispositions of a contract, is identical with
French Article 1320. Article 2242, stating that an instrument un-
der private signature acknowledged or legally held to have been
acknowledged as his act by the party signing it has the same
effect as an authentic act, is a facsimile of French Article 1322.
Article 2244 is almost an exact copy of French Article 1323 which
deals with acknowledgment and judicial declaration of the verity
of signatures on acts under private signature." Article 1341 of the
French Civil Code contains several clauses, one of which estab-
lishes the prohibition of oral proof against a written instrument.
This clause is but slightly altered in our Article 2276.45 The sec-
43. Art. 1319, French Civil Code: "'L'acte authentique fait pleine foi de la
convention qu'il renferme entre Zes parties contractantes et leura hdritiers
ou ayants cause." Art. 2233, La. Civil Code of 1825 (Art. 2236, La. Civil Code
of 1870) is a reproduction of this sentence, adding as a subsequent clause
the modification, "sauf le cas oit i est argud de faux, et o,& le faux est
prouvd" (Translation) "except in the case where forgery is alleged and
proved," in the stead of the second paragraph of the French article, which
deals with suspending execution of the act pending trial of criminal charges
for forgery.
44. Art. 1323, French Civil Code: "Celui auquel on oppose un acte sous
seing privd, est obligd d'avouer ou de ddsavouer formellement son ecriture
ou sa signature.
"Ses heritiers ou ayants cause peuvent se contenter de declarer qu'ils ne
connaissent point Z'1criture ou la signature de leur auteur."
(Translation) "The person against whom an act under private signature
is produced, is obliged formally to avow or disavow his handwriting or his
signature.
"The heirs or assigns may simply declare that they know not the hand-
writing or the signature of the person whom they represent."
The only difference is that Art. 2244, La. Civil Code of 1870, omits the
italicized words of the first paragraph.
45. Since Article 2275, the preceding article, deals with contracts rela-
tive to immovables, it has been stated that Article 2276 is inapplicable to
contracts dealing with movables. Clamagaran v. Sacerdotte, 8 Mart. (N.S.)
533 (La. 1830). There are statements also that Article 2276 Is primarily ap-
plicable to contracts relating to immovables and may not apply in the case
of other contracts. Groner v. Cavender, 133 So. 825, 827 (La. App. 1931). Cf.
Suthon v. Cambon Bros., 159 La. 134, 105 So. 252 (1925).
However, as is pointed out supra, p. 431, the purpose of the prohibition of
oral testimony against a written instrument is not to prevent proof of title
to realty by parol, but to prevent impeachment of a superior means of proof
by an inferior.
In the Code of 1808, it is true, the prohibition against parol evidence
apparently related only to contracts dealing with immovables.
"Every covenant tending to dispose by a gratuitous or incumbered title
of any immovable property or slaves in this territory, must be reduced to
writing and in case the existing [sic] of such covenant be disputed, no parol
evidence shall be admitted to prove it." La. Civil Code of 1808, 3.4.241, p. 310.
But the Projet of 1825 divided the two ideas and its proposed statement
makes clear the intention to extend the rule over all written agreements.
("No parol evidence shall be admitted to contradict a written agreement
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tion on presumptions, Articles 2284 through 2288, is copied ver-
batim from Articles 1349 through 1353 of the French Code. The
section dealing with confessions, Articles 2289 through 2291, is
taken directly from the French Code.4
Three articles relevant to the problem here under considera-
tion remain to be considered. These are Articles 1900, 2234, and
2237. Article 2234 in defining the authentic act, qualifies the
definition in the French Code by the phrase "as it relates to con-
tracts. 4 7 Insofar as the document against or beyond which parol
evidence is to be introduced is a subsisting and valid contract,
this addition to the French text should not change the prohibition
against parol evidence. The same rule should apply even if the
contract has been resolved, and the effort is to prove that an
amount different from that stated in the contract has been paid.
The act, although the contract it evidences is resolved, is still
valid evidence of the facts stated in it, such as the recital of con-
sideration;46 and the acknowledgment of consideration still sub-
sists as a receipt, making proof of the payment. Therefore, Article
2234 does not appear to change the French doctrine.
Article 1900 first appeared in the Code of 1825. It declares
that, although the cause expressed in the contract be nonexistent,
the contract is yet valid if a true and sufficient consideration be
shown.49 It has been said that the purpose of the adoption of this
[French text: "acte"], or to explain it, where there is no ambiguity in its
statements." Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, p. 289.) The text finally adopted
was taken almost verbatim from that provision of the French Civil Code
(Art. 1341) upon which the prohibition of parol testimony against any writ-
ten instrument is based. This seems a clear manifestation of an intention
to adopt the French rule of parol evidence. Accordingly, Article 2276 has
been correctly held applicable to all written contracts. Knox v. Liddell, 5
Rob. 111 (La. 1843); Cary v. Richardson, 35 La. Ann. 505 (1883). See Trager
v. The Louisiana Equitable Life Ins. Co., 31 La. Ann. 235, 242 (1879); Mc-
Collister Bros. v. Labarre, 7 La. App. 350, 354 (1928); Salley v. Louviere, 183
La. 92, 99, 162 So. 811, 813 (1935).
46. Although there is no section corresponding to that in the French
Civil Code on oaths, the omission has no effect on the problem under con-
sideration for the oath is a means of finally determining cases, not a type of
evidence.
47. Art. 1317, French Civil Code: "Llacte authentique est celui qui a dt6
requ par offtciers publics... 3
Art. 2234, La. Civil Code of 1870 contains this definition, adding the
italicized words: "The authentic act, as relates to contracts, is that which
has been executed before a notary public. .. ."
48. After resolution, the price to be restored will be fixed in accordance
with the stipulations of the contract, which implies that the contract has
not completely vanished. 6 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 3, at 600, no
433. See also 4 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 133, § 302.
49. Art. 1900, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the cause expressed in the con-
sideration should be one that does not exist, yet the contract cannot be in-
validated, if the party can show the existence of a true and sufficient
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article was "to admit oral evidence of a different cause or con-
sideration than that expressed in the act."5
An examination of the early French authorities leads to a
different conclusion. While oral testimony is recognized as ad-
missible to show the true cause of a contract for the purpose of
sustaining it, this is permissible only where the falsity of the
recital of consideration has been demonstrated by evidence or-
dinarily admissible against written contracts. 1 The early French
authorities announce the same principle as that contained in Ar-
ticle 1900. 52 Yet the courts and commentators agree that the path
is not cleared for oral proof of true consideration until the receipt
contained in the contract is disproved by other legally admissible
evidence. 58 Thus, the principle of Article 1900 as it appears in
French jurisprudence is that after the cause stated in a contract
has been disproved by legally admissible evidence, the creditor
may then show the existence of a legally sufficient cause. For
this purpose he may use any type of evidence." A similar view
has been expressed in Louisiana.5" Very likely Article 1900 is
derived from French sources. Even if it were not, the conclusion
reached through the application of the same principle in French
jurisprudence is entitled to weight.
The exception de non numerata pecunia, abolished by Article
consideration." The word "consideration" in the first clause of the article
is a mistranslation of the French text in the Code of 1825 and should be
read "contract."
50. Chief Justice O'Niell's dissent in Robinson v. Britton, 69 So. 282, 284
(La. 1915).
51. See page 432, supra.
52. 3 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 382, no 176. See also 12 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Barde, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, 1 Des
Obligations (3 ed. 1906) 341, no 308, 371, no 319; 2 Demogue, op. cit. supra note
10, at 786, no 869; 10 Duranton, op. cit. supra note 6, at 360, no 351; 4 Marcadd,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 398, Art. 1132; 6 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 364, no 265.
53. Supra notes 36, 38.
54. Cass. 5 dcembre 1900, Sirey 1901.1.229. 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note
8, at 454, no 1206.
55. "Articles 1893, 1896, and 1900 have no application to the case of a
contract .-. . in which a valid, definite, existing consideration given and re-
ceived is clearly expressed save that in such case the real contract, if there
be one, other than that expressed in the act, may be developed by a counter
letter or by interrogatories. Robinson v. Britton, 137 La. 863, 867, 69 So.
282, 283 (1915).
Brown v. Brown, 30 La. Ann. 966, 969 (1878): "Where a contract, there-
fore, is attacked on the ground that the expressed consideration does not
exist, or that there was no consideration for it, the party may show other
consideration than that expressed in the contract."
But the true and sufficient consideration which can be shown means
such consideration as was contemplated at the time of execution of the act
but which was misdescribed therein. Chaffe v. Scheen, 34 La. Ann. 684 (1882);
Chaffe v. Ludeling, 34 La. Ann. 962, 964 (1882).
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2237, originated in Roman law. The exception shifted the bur-
den of proving a payment acknowledged by one party to his
opponent whose rights depended on payment.5 7 By it the party
who had acknowledged receipt of the payment alleged that the
money was not actually counted out (non numerata) to him, that
is, that it was not paid. 8 The exception is said to have been
abolished in France because the Civil Code failed to mention it.5
Under French law the non-receipt of an acknowledged payment
must be proved by the party who alleges it and oral testimony
is inadmissible if it is a case of proving against a writing.0 By
expressly abolishing the exception, Article 2237 does no more
than overrrule the early Louisiana cases which had admitted it."
Since the exception dealt only with the burden of proof, its pro-
scription should not have affected the parol evidence doctrine in
any way.
Is THE FRENCH DOCTRINE APPLICABLE IN LOUISIANA?
In view of the demonstrated similarity between the French
and Louisiana provisions on the problem under discussion, the
French principle that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary in
any way the recital of consideration in a written contract, should
obtain in Louisiana. The Louisiana cases should now be examined
with this in mind.
THE LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE
Taken as a group, the Louisiana decisions support the rule
that parol evidence is inadmissible either to vary the amount of
56. The exception dealt with obligations contracted by simple agreement,
without the tie of the technical and formal stipulatio. Although agreements
contracted without the stipulatio were legally enforceable, the exception was
one of the limitations on the rights of a creditor who sought to enforce an
obligation as consideration for which he had paid a sum of money. 4 Toullier,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 272, no 636.
57. 13 Scott, The Civil Law, A Translation of Justinian's Code (1932) 70,
bk. IV, tit. XXX, § 3.
58. Bonnier, op. cit. supra note 34, at 36, no 43; 6 Planiol et Ripert, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 342, no 250. The exception is said to have been founded
on the ancient belief that a negative proposition was not susceptible of
proof. Bonnier, supra; 4 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 56.
The exception was also recognized at Spanish law. Las Siete Partidas
(Scott, 1931) Part. V, tit. I, Law IX. The notarial forms contained in Part.
III, tit. XVIII, Laws LVI, LX, LXI, LXIV, LXV, and LXX all contain a
recitation that the consideration was paid in the sight of the notary to pre-
vent the exception from being invoked.
59. Bonnier, loc. cit. supra note 58; 4 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 56.
60. 4 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 58.
61. Berthole v. Mace, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 576 (La. 1818); 10 Mart. (N.S.) 256
(La. 1823). See the dissenting opinion in Robinson v. Britton, 69 So. 282, 284
(La. 1915).
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the consideration or to disprove a payment acknowledged in a
written contract.
Thus, where the purpose is to invalidate a contract, oral testi-
mony is inadmissible to show that the contract was "simulated, 6 2
or that, although the parties seriously intended to contract, no
consideration was ever received.68 Such testimony is likewise
62. "It is horn-book law in our jurisprudence that the verity and reality
of authentic sales can be assailed by the parties thereto only . . . by means
of a counter letter . . . [or] by the answers of the other party to inter-
rogatories on facts and articles." Godwin v. Neustadtl, 42 La. Ann. 735, 738,
7 So. 744, 745 (1890). Note the cases cited therein.
The same rule has been applied indiscriminately to sales recorded by
authentic acts or acts under private signature. Michoud v. Lacroix, 8 Mart.
(N.S.) 445 (La. 1830); Purdon v. Linton's Executors, 9 La. 563 (1836); Wolf
v. Wolf, 12 La. Ann. 529 (1857); H~bert v. Lg6, 29 La. Ann. 511 (1877); Cary
v. Richardson, 35 La. Ann. 505 (1883); Johnson v. Flanner, 42 La. Ann. 522,
7 So. 455 (1890); W. B. Thompson & Co. v. Herring, 45 La. Ann. 991, 13 So.
308 (1893); Maskrey v. Johnson, 122 La. 791, 48 So. 266 (1909); Sherman v.
Nehlig, 154 La. 25, 97 So. 270 (1923); Locascio v. First State Bank & Trust
Co. of Hammond, 168 La. 723, 123 So. 304 (1929); Brinker v. Feist, 14 La.
App. 301, 129 So. 416 (1930); Schrock v. Bolding, 171 La. 929, 132 So. 504
(1931).
Art. 2239, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 5 of 1884, permits
forced heirs of a party to the simulation to attack it by parol evidence and
to annul such contracts in their entirety. Prior to the amendment, they were
restricted in their right of action to their legitime. Spencer v. Lewis, 39 La.
Ann. 316, 1 So. 671 (1887); Westmore v. Harz, 111 La. 305, 35 So. 578 (1905);
Sere v. Darby, 118 La. 619, 43 So. 255 (1907). If, however, the heirs are party
to the simulation, the general rule applies and parol evidence is inadmissible.
Barnes v. Barnes, 155 La. 981, 99 So. 719 (1924); Glover v. Abney, 160 La. 175,
106 So. 735 (1926).
The Louisiana courts apparently use the term "simulation" to apply
only to a feigned sale. The French commentators use the term in a broader
sense to apply to any contract which conceals the true facts and is modified
by another contract, the counter letter, revealing the real situation. The
contract may be completely simulated, or the nature of the instrument dis-
guised, the parties concealed, or a fact misstated. 2 Josserand, op. cit. supra
note 27, at 165, nos 320, 321; 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 8, at 446, nos 1186-
1187. Parol evidence is inadmissible to show any type of simulation unless
the contract be designed to evade a mandatory prohibition of the law, to
accomplish a fraud of the law. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at
375, § 765; and authorities cited supra notes 37 and 38.
63. Baker v. Voorhies, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 312 (La. 1827); Cook v. Parkarson,
16 La. 129 (1840); Heath v. Locke, 18 La. 68 (1841); Succession of Thomas,
12 Rob. 215 (La. 1845); Trager v. Louisiana Equitable Life Ins. Co., 31 La.
Ann. 235 (1879); Vial v. Moll, 37 La. Ann. 203 (1885); Henderson v. Guerin,
10 Orl. App. 243 (La. App. 1913). Apparently contra are Falcon v. Boucher-
ville, 1 Rob. 338 (La. 1842); Kugler v. Taylor, 19 La. Ann. 100 (1867).
In the leading case, Robinson v. Britton, 137 La. 863, 69 So. 282 (1915),
plaintiff attempted to annul a sale of land. The court refused to allow parol
evidence to show (1) the cash consideration receipt of which was acknowl-
edged in the contract was never paid, (2) that the contract was intended to
be one of exchange, and (3) that no consideration had ever been given. A
vigorous dissent was written by Chief Justice O'Niell. It may be argued
that the case is authority only as to written contracts of sale of land, for,
in such cases, permitting annulment of the sale would be to permit transfer
of title to an immovable by parol evidence.
The argument forgets, however, that oral testimony is usually admitted
to change title to land whenever a contract for the sale of land is impeached
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inadmissible to show that an ostensible contract was actually a
disguised donation.64 Where receipt of consideration is acknowl-
edged, absence of cause will not result in invalidity unless proved
in conformity with the evidentiary rules.6 - If no consideration
66
or only a nominal consideration67 is expressed in the writing,
oral testimony will be admitted to show that consideration was
actually given. This follows the rule that the contract is not the
less valid although the consideration is not expressed. 8 Further-
more, proof that the consideration presumed by law in such a
case was not actually given does not violate the rule, for no cause
is actually stated.6 9 This may explain those cases which admitted
for fraud, error, violence, or violation of a resolutory condition. Article 2275
applies only to prevent private transfer of immovables. It does not apply
to a judicial judgment of ownership. No distinction should be drawn between
the case of a contract of sale of land and any other written contract. See
note 45, supra. Robinson v. Britton seems to announce a correct general
principle in denying the admissibility of parol testimony. Shannon v. Shan-
non, 188 La. 588, 177 So. 676 (1937); Barre v. Hunter, 181 So. 674 (La. App.
1938); Johnson v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 185 So. 289 (1938).
64. Lawson v. Conolly, 51 La. Ann. 1753, 26 So. 612 (1899); Jeansonne v.
Jeansonne, 187 La. 939, 175 So. 626 (1937); and see cases cited in note 63,
supra.
65. " . . as between the parties to a written act, the only admissible
evidence to prove simulation is a counter letter. . . ." Cary v. Richardson,
35 La. Ann. 505, 509 (1883). Equally admissible is the interrogatory on facts
and articles, cases cited notes 62 and 63, supra.
66. Parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for a
written contract which does not recite a consideration. Klein v. Dinkgrave,
4 La. Ann. 540 (1849); Read v. Hewitt, 120 La. 288, 45 So. 143 (1907); Crichton
Co. v. Smith, 18 La. App. 567, 137 So. 643 (1931); Texas Co. v. Couvillon, 160
So. 839 (La. App. 1935); Consolidated Companies v. Angelloz, 170 So. 556 (La.
App. 1936).
67. Although there is no square decision on the-issue, the court has inti-
mated that parol evidence would be admissible to show the true considera
tion where a nominal consideration of one dollar is stated. See Moore v.
Pitre, 149 La. 910, 90 So. 252 (1921); Morris v. Monroe Sand & Gravel Co.,
166 La. 656, 117 So. 763 (1928).
Where the contract recites a stated sum "and other valuable considera-
tion," oral evidence may be used to show the nature of the other consid-
eration. Linkswiler v. Hoffman, 109 La. 948, 34 So. 34 (1903); Klumpp v.
Howcott, 139 La. 163, 71 So. 353 (1916); Morris v. Monroe Sand & Gravel
Co., supra. But the opponent of the contract may not show that the stated
sum was not received. Johnson v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1938),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939
Term (1939) 2 LOUISANA LAW REviEw 31, 50, in which the problem of the
present comment was raised.
68. Art. 1894, La. Civil Code of 1870. A just consideration is presumed
unless the contrary be proved. Barrow v. Cazeaux, 5 La. 72 (1833); Pack v.
Chapman, 16 La. Ann. 366 (1861); Read v. Hewitt, 120 La. 288, 45 So. 143
(1907); Martin v. McCloskey, 155 La. 604, 99 So. 477 (1924); Crichton Co. v.
Smith, 18 La. App. 567, 137 So. 643 (1931). See also 4 Aubry et Rau, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 557, § 345; 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra
note 52, at 368, § 318; Gaudemet, op. cit. supra note 15, at 131; 2 Josserand,
op. cit. supra note 27, at 70, no 137; 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 8, at 399,
no 1044.
69. 4 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 558-559, § 345.
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oral testimony to prove want of consideration in a promissory
note,70 prior to legislation on the subject. 1
The question as to whether or not proof that a greater or
lesser consideration than that acknowledged in writing may be
given is one that has been several times contested. In these cases,
the evidence is offered, not to invalidate the contract, but to
prove the amount actually received for some other purpose. The
latest case directly raising the question is Grimm v. Pugh7 2 a
recent court of appeal decision. In a suit to recover the sums
paid for a mineral lease declared invalid because of error, the
plaintiff sought to prove by parol evidence that he had paid a
sum larger than that stated in the lease. Somewhat reluctantly
the court held that the evidence was inadmissible, and stated the
following rule:
".... parol testimony is not admissible to prove a greater con-
sideration than that set out in the instrument, unless the in-
strument is attacked because of want of consideration or
insufficiency of consideration; but parol testimony is admis-
sible to show that the consideration set out in the deed or
instrument was not wholly paid, although receipt of it is ac-
knowledged in the contract."7 8
The enunciated rule proceeds from an attempt to reconcile
a number of previous cases on the subject. Among them is Dick-
son v. Ford 74 involving a suit for cancellation of a mortgage
which recited as consideration the indebtedness of the mortgagor.
Parol evidence of the nature of the indebtedness was admitted
to permit the plaintiff to prove discharge of his obligation. Grant-
70. It does not appear in any of these early cases involving promissory
notes that a consideration was stated. Parol evidence was admitted to show
want of consideration. Grieve's Syndics v. Sagory, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 599 (La.
1815); LeBlanc v. Sanglair, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 402 (La. 1822); Byrd v. Craig,
1 Mart. (N.S.) 625 (La. 1823); Hebert v. Landry, 3 La. 303 (1832); Greenwell
v. Roberts, 7 La. 63 (1834); Griffin & Dyson v. Cowan, Dykers & Co., 15 La.
Ann. 487 (1860); Reeve v. Doughty, 19 La. Ann. 164 (1867); Gillard v. Huval,
22 La. Ann. 426 (1870); Phillips v. W. T. Adams Mach. Co., 52 La. Ann. 442,
27 So. 65 (1899). It was also admitted in Coupry's Heirs v. Dufau, 1 Mart.
(N.S.) 90 (La. 1823) (bill of exchange was involved).
71. Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Law providing that "absence
• . . of consideration Is a matter of defense as against any person not a
holder in due course" (La. Act 64 of 1904, § 28 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 817])
effects no change in the prior rule, and parol evidence is admissible to show
the true consideration for a promissory note. Sere v. Darby, 118 La. 619, 43
So. 255 (1907); Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Hearn, 179 La. 909, 155 So.
396 (1934).
72. 197 So. 641 (La. App. 1940).
73. Id. at 645.
74. 38 La. Ann. 736 (1886).
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ing the interpretation of the court that the word "indebtedness"
does not necessarily imply only contracted debts,7 5 there was no
proof against or beyond the terms of the contract, for neither a
greater nor a lesser nor otherwise different consideration was
claimed. The character of the indebtedness was shown merely for
the purpose of proving execution of the contract, a fact which
may be shown by oral testimony.6 On its facts, then, Dickson v.
Ford77 is support for neither side of the question here involved.
In Queensborough Land Company v. Cazeaux, 5 which was
also considered, recission of a contract was granted on the basis
of a resolutory condition not involving the consideration. The
plaintiff offered proof that he received less than the payment
acknowledged in the contract. The court treated the recital of
consideration as a simple receipt and summarily declared that,
as such, it was open to oral explanation, for "the purpose of the
offer is not to defeat the contract. 7 9 This case denied the rule
that parol evidence is inadmissible against any written instru-
ment having a juridical effect.80 The court thereby misconstrued
the rules established by the Civil Code,81 and this without any
discussion of earlier jurisprudence. 2
75. Cf. Brander v. Bowmar, 16 La. 370 (1840); Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown,
7 La. Ann. 297 (1852).
76. Proving performance or execution of a contract clearly does not vary
the contract. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 334, § 763; 5 Marcad6,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 113, Art. 1341; 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 8, at 428,
no 1139.
77. 38 La. Ann. 736 (1886). The court implied that it was proceeding on
the principle that parol evidence Is admissible, "not against or beyond what
is contained in the acts .. .but . . . to ascertain the true intent of the par-
ties when the same is not clearly expressed or described therein." (Italics
supplied.) (38 La. Ann. at 740.)
78. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
79. 136 La. at 739, 67 So. at 646.
80. See supra p. 433.
81. See supra p. 438, n. 62.
82. Although the court differentiated the case by stating that the "pur-
pose of the offer is not to defeat the contract," prior jurisprudence holds
testimonial evidence inadmissible even where there is no attempt to invali-
date the contract. Thus, in Forest v. Shores, 11 La. 416 (1837), parol could
not be introduced to show that a balance was still due on a price acknowl-
edged to have been received in the act of sale. In Hill v. Hall, 4 Rob. 416 (La.
1843), the party suing on a promissary note, receipt of which was acknowl-
edged in a mortgage, was not permitted to show by parol that he had not
received the note at that time. Cf. Ruston Brick Works v. Heard, 177 So.
494 (La. App. 1937), where parol was held admissible because of error of
the parties. Oral evidence was held inadmissible to show that, although the
note stated that it was given in payment for certain enumerated services,
it was intended to cover all fees due the plaintiff. Dwight v. Kemper, 8 La.
Ann. 452 (1853). Nor could parol be admitted to show a greater consideration
than that stated in the act of sale as a defense to an action of rescission for
lesion beyond moiety. Girod v. Vines, 23 La. Ann. 588 (1871). And in a case
strikihgly similar in principle to the Queensborough case, where a contract
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In Brewer v. New Orleans Land Company a purchaser sued
to recover the purchase price following the vendor's failure to
make good title. Parol evidence was offered to show that a greater
sum than that stated in the contract had been paid. The evidence
was excluded, the court correctly declaring Article 1900 inappli-
cable because, "the purpose of the article is to enable a vendee
to maintain the validity of a sale when attacked on account of
the consideration, by showing the true consideration." The court
distinguished the Queensborough case on the ground that:
"In that case the court admitted parol evidence, not to show
that the amount of the consideration was different from that
stated in the deed, but to prove the amount that the Queens-
borough Land Co. actually received from Cazeaux, and should
therefore refund to him .... The court did not, however, hold
that a different consideration in amount may be proved in
such a suit by parol from that expressed or agreed to in the
act of sale, which additional fact it is necessary to prove in
the case at bar. . . ." (Italics supplied.)8 4
It is difficult to perceive any logical distinction between the
Brewer and Queensborough cases. Both involve a simple state-
ment of fact, an acknowledgment of receipt of a stated sum. It
is a mere circumstance that in one case the sum actually paid
was greater than that acknowledged, while in the other it was
less. If proving that a greater sum changed hands than that stated
is proving a different consideration, why would not the same
effect result from proving that a lesser sum changed hands? Both
cases involve attempts to recover a sum different from the one
stated. An attempt to draw a distinction, as was done in Grimm
v. Pugh, on the basis of the relative size of the sums involved
cannot be justified. Later cases have been correct in following
the Brewer case.8 -
An interesting problem arises when a certain sum is stated
was rescinded for error and fraud, the recital of consideration received could
not be contradicted by evidence that a consideration was paid and hence
should be restored. Formento v. Robert, 27 La. Ann. 489 (1875). The only
case which admitted parol prior to the Queensborough case where the at-
tempt was not to defeat the contract was Saramia v. Courr6g6, 13 La. Ann.
25 (1858). There the defendant was permitted to prove that the consideration
paid him for a sale, referred to in the act as a stated sum of "current
money," included an obligation of the plaintiff to discharge the note sued
upon.
83. 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923).
84. 154 La. at 455, 97 So. at 608.
85. Lockwood Oil Co. v. Atkins, 158 La. 610, 104 So. 386 (1925); Johnson
v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1938), cited supra note 67.
[Vol. III
COMMENTS
as consideration and there is an attempt to show, for one pur-
pose or another, that this was merely a lump statement of the
value of various acts to be performed, or sales to be made, or
debts to be paid.8 It is sometimes said that in such cases the
oral testimony is admitted "to give effect to the contract ... by
supplementing necessary information which was omitted. 87 Even
then the correctness of permitting the consideration to be shown
different in nature from that stated may be doubted. In effect,
there is a direct contradiction of the consideration stated. This
is certainly proof "against" the contents of the instrument. A
factor of influence in such cases is that a blanket statement of
a monetary sum as consideration is usually adopted by the parties
for convenience, and it seems unjust to permit one party to later
use this as a screen for perpetrating an injustice on the other.
Yet many injustices may be perpetrated by the parol evidence
rule. The very theory of the rule is that a writing, although it
may be inaccurate, is generally more dependable than the testi-
mony of witnesses.
If parol evidence is inadmissible to vary a declaration of
fact, such as the statement of the receipt of consideration, it is
a fortiori inadmissible to disprove the terms of a contract, that
is, to show a promise different from that stated. Thus parol is
inadmissible to prove a promise by a vendee to divide profits
realized on the resale of land in addition to the price stated in the
act of sale transferring title to him, 88 or, generally, any promise to
pay a greater consideration than that stated;8 9 nor is oral evidence
86. Illustrative cases are Forest v. Shores, 11 La. 416 (1837); Falcon v.
Boucherville, 1 Rob. 337 (La. 1842); Saramia v. Courr~g6, 13 La. Ann. 25
(1858), discussed supra note 82. In McConnell v. Harris Chevrolet Co., 147
So. 827 (La. App. 1933), the act of sale merely recited that a stated sum
had been paid; parol was admitted to show that the price paid included a
payment for insurance.
However, some of the cases admitting parol seem justified. Thus, parol
was admissible to show as against unsecured creditors, that the sum stated
in a sale of land actually included secured claims. Succession of Rhodes, 164
La. 488, 114 So. 107 (1927). Or that a cash consideration was stated through
error as to legal requirements. Ruston Brick Works v. Heard, 177 So. 494
(La. App. 1937). But parol was properly excluded when the contract stated
a paid cash consideration and plaintiff sought to show the consideration was
to be delivery of trucks. Truett Nash Motor Co. v. Centanni, 184 So. 362 (La.
App. 1938).
87. Barre v. Hunter, 181 So. 674, 675 (La. App. 1938).
88. Hart v. Clark's Executors, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 614 (La. 1918); Pfeiffer v.
Nienaber, 143 La. 601, 78 So. 977 (1918).
89. Clark's Executors v. Farrar, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 247 (La. 1814); Harrison
v. Laverty, 8 Mart. (O.S.) 213 (La. 1820); Goodloe v. Hart, 2 La. 446 (1831);
Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Kokosky, 113 La. 449, 87 So. 24 (1904); Hemler v.
Adcock, 166 La. 704, 117 So. 781 (1928). See Succession of Tilghman, 11 Rob.
124 (La. 1845). It may not be shown by parol that an additional consideration
19411
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admissible to show that the obligor agreed to accept less than
the sum stated.0
On the problem of admission of testimonial evidence to vary
or contradict a simple receipt, the Louisiana cases are not in
accord with the French authorities. The cases generally announce
that a receipt may be contradicted, varied, or explained by parol
evidence91 These decisions appear to be incorrect, since Article
2276 deals with "acts," that is, written instruments, not merely
contracts. The reasoning and theory underlying the civil law
parol evidence rule is as applicable to a receipt as to a contract.
Insofar as a receipt implies by its very nature whole or partial
discharge of an obligation, it has juridical effect. Since it is also
the intentionally selected form of evidence, to admit parol is to
disregard the choice of the parties. After rescission of a contract,
its recital of consideration has no more legal effect than a written
receipt. Yet that recital still binds the parties. Exclusion of parol
evidence in the one case should, logically, result in exclusion
in the other.
In addition to the cases where fraud, error, or violence is
involved, a general exception to the parol evidence rule is found
in both Louisiana and French jurisprudence. Parol evidence is
admissible to show that a contract was made in violation of a
prohibitory rule of law, in fraud of law.92 Thus, parol evidence
was agreed upon and has failed in order to rescind the contract for failure
of consideration. Louisiana Sulphur Mining Co. v. Brimstone R. & Canal
Co., 143 La. 743, 79 So. 324 (1918). Cf. Wainwright v. Gilham, 188 So. 434(La. App. 1939). The admissibility of parol to prove a contemporaneous
collateral agreement is discussed in a Note (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIsw
460.
90. Berthole v. Mace, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 576 (La. 1818); Reimers v. Hebert,
7 La. App. 56 (1927); Monroe Investment Co. v. Ford, 168 La. 475, 122 So. 586
(1929).
91. Clamagaran v. Sacerdotte, 8 Mart. (N.S.)- 533 (La. 1830); Bass v.
Balph, 5 La. Ann. 235 (1850); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 5 La. Ann. 406 (1850);
Tardiff v. Baudoin, 9 La. Ann. 127 (1854); Gray v. Lonsdale, 10 La. Ann.
749 (1855); Succession of Croizet, 12 La. Ann. 401 (1857); Bringier v. Gordon,
14 La. Ann. 274 (1859); Draughan v. Collins, 21 La. Ann. 175 (1869); Porter
v. Brown and Chaler, 21 La. Ann. 532 (1869); Borden v. Hope, 21 La. Ann.
581 (1869); Wells v. Sherrill Hardwood Lumber Co., 151 La. 1081, 92 So. 706
(1922). See B~rard v. Boagni, 30 La. Ann. 1125, 1127 (1878); Dixie Mills Sup-
ply Co. v. Town of Homer, 6 La. App. 714 (1927); Anders v. Lee-Rogers
Chevrolet Co., 7 La. App. 481 (1927); Demasi v. Whitney Trust & Savings
Bank, 176 So. 703 (La. App. 1937). But see Chew v. Chinn, 7 Mart. (N.S.)
532 (1829), holding parol evidence admissible to show that the "payment"
mentioned in a receipt was a promissory note, on the ground that such
testimony does not really contradict the receipt or impair its legal effect,
and Glennon v. Vatter, 109 La. 942, 33 So. 930 (1903), holding, semble, that a
receipt in the form of an authentic act is conclusive, although the case was
finally decided on the basis of prescription.
92. Fireman's Ins. Co. of New Orleans v. Cross, 4 Rob. 508 (La. 1843);
COMMENTS
is admissible to show that an ostensible dation en paiement was
in reality a donation of all the donor's property in contravention
of Article 1497.8 It is not clear what legal principles are prohibi-
tory within the meaning of this rule. The strength of the policy
the courts feel to be embodied in the article or statute under con-
sideration is probably the major factor, with some regard placed
on the wording of the legislation."
In conclusion, it may be said that except for occasional aber-
rations the Louisiana decisions have correctly applied the Code
articles, although the Queensborough case has never been over-
ruled and the receipt cases remain anomalous. The general rule
established by the decisions is that parol evidence is inadmissible
to vary in any way the recital in a written contract that a stated
sum has been received as consideration. The wisdom of such a
rule may be questioned. It may be objected that it should not
be possible to evade the legal requirement of consideration by a
mere recital, and further that the probative value of a written
instrument should not be so great. Notwithstanding the fact that
common law jurisdictions in general follow different principles,9 5
our Code has adopted the French rule. If a change is to come,
it should come only by way of legislative amendment of the Civil
Code.
ALVIN B. RUBIN
THE PROBLEM OF A SERIES OF MORTGAGE NOTES
A very usual form of borrowing is the giving of a series of
notes secured by a special mortgage. While such a series may
often be held in its entirety by a single creditor, yet since the
notes are negotiable, transfers may be readily effected by which
each note becomes the property of a different owner. It is surpris-
ing, then, that the respective rights of each of the holders of such
Equitable Securities Co. v. Talbert, 49 La. Ann. 1393, 22 So. 762 (1897); Kelley
v. Kelley, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913); Becker v. Hampton, 137 La. 323,
68 So. 626 (1915). See Arts. 11, 12, La. Civil Code of 1870. For the French
rule in accord, 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 375-376, § 765; 2
Josserand, op. cit. supra note 27, at 115, no 216; 6 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 476, no 348.
93. Kelley v. Kelley, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
94. See the French commentators and the Louisiana cases on forced
heirship cited supra note 62.
95. Because of the differences in theory and application of the civil and
common law rules of parol evidence, and because of lack of space, common
law rules on the problem were not discussed.
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